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HISTORY 



OF THE 



MANUFACTURE OF ARMOR PLATE 



FOE THE 



UNITED STATES NAVY. 



COMPILED BY 

THE AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL ASSOCIATION. 



December 1, 1899. 



PHILADELPHIA : 

THE AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL ASSOCIATION. 

No. 261 South Fourth Street. 

1899. 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 



Congressional Legislation Relating to the Price 
of Armor for United States Naval Vessels. 



The first contract for armor was made by the Navy 
Department with the Bethlehem Iron Company on June 
1, 1887. This contract was for the armor for the battle- 
ships Maine and Texas and for the monitors Puritan, Am- 
pMtrite, MonadnocJc, and Terror. The am.ount of armor 
contracted for was estimated at about 6,700 tons, at an 
average price of about $536 per ton. This armor, as con- 
tracted for, was of plain steel, oil-tempered and annealed. 
Later, and after careful experimenting by the Navy De- 
partment, the introduction of nickel into steel for armor 
was specified on account of the increased ballistic resist- 
ance which could thus be obtained. Armor treated by 
the Harvey process, whereby the faces of the plates are 
hardened, having been found to be far superior to homo- 
geneous or soft-faced armor, the Navy Department order- 
ed the application of this process to all armor not com- 
pleted at that time. For each of the above new features 
an additional price was paid. 

In the Report of the Secretary of the Navy for the 
year 1890 Secretary Tracy gives the reasons for making 
the first armor contract with Carnegie, Phipps & Co., 
Lim.ited. In the fall of 1890 other armor was needed, 
or would soon be needed, for vessels then authorized, in 
addition to the armor contracted for with the Bethlehem 
Iron Company, and it appeared to the Department that it 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 6 

was necessary to induce another steel manufacturing com- 
pany to go into this business. Accordingly negotiations 
were opened by Secretary Tracy with Carnegie, Phipps & 
Co., with a view to the establishment of another plant 
for the manufacture of armor. 

The proposition was promptly declined, as the manu- 
facture of armor was not considered a profitable business ; 
but, at the urgent solicitation of the President and of Sec- 
retary Tracy, the proposition was reconsidered, resulting 
in a contract being made with the company named, da- 
ted November 20, 1890, for 6,000 tons of plain steel ar- 
mor, oil-tempered and annealed, the prices to be paid be- 
ing those named in the contract with the Bethlehem Iron 
Company. A provision was inserted in this contract that 
nickel-steel armor might be ordered instead of plain steel 
armor. An additional agreement was afterwards made 
which provided for the Harvey treatment of the armor. 
All the armor made under this contract was of nickel- 
steel, and part of it was Harvey treated, as in the case of 
the armor furnished under the contract with the Bethle- 
hem Iron Company, the same allowance being made to 
both companies for these extra requirements to cover the 
additional cost of manufacture. 

ADDITIONAL ARMOR CONTRACTS. 

On the 28th of February, 1893, a second contract for 
about 3,000 tons of nickel-steel armor, to be treated by 
the Harvey process, was made with the Carnegie Steel 
Company, Limited, which had purchased in the mean- 
time the works of Carnegie, Phipps & Co., and on March 
1, 1893, a second contract for about 3,500 tons of similar 
armor was made with the Bethlehem Iron Company. 
The prices at which all of this armor was contracted for 
were about the same for nickel-steel armor as had been 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 4 

paid in the former contracts for plain steel armor, the 
Department furnishing the nickel and paying an addi- 
tional amount for the Harvey treatment. 

In the Report of Hon. Hilary A. Herbert, Secretary of 
the Navy, for the year 1896, page 27, the following para- 
graph appears : 

While the Department, durmg the summer of 1895, was preparmg 
advertisements for armor for the Kearsarge and Kentucky I had a pro- 
longed interview with the representatives of the Bethlehem and Car- 
negie companies, in which I insisted on lower prices. After much dis- 
cussion and some altercation these companies agreed in writing that 
their prices should be at least §50 per ton lower than they had pre- 
viously received. This was before the Congress met in December. 
When Congress had convened the Committee on Naval Affairs of the 
Senate began for itself an investigation into the prices of armor, pend- 
ing which the advertisement was held up, until the committee, seeing 
that its investigation was likely to be prolonged, suggested that the De- 
partment should proceed with its contracts. The companies both com- 
plied fully with their agreements, and the armor for the Kearsarge and 
Kentucky was all let at prices averaging a reduction of $59.54 per ton 
from previous contract rates, although the requirements were greater. 
A still further reduction of $9.98 per ton in the price of this armor is 
due to the decreased cost of the nickel used. 

The armor for the Kearsarge and Kentucky thus con- 
tracted for amounted to about 5,600 tons. 

IKQUIRY INTO THE COST OF MAKING ARMOR. 

In the act making appropriations for the naval service 
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1897, and for other 
purposes, approved June 10, 1896, three sea-going coast- 
line battle-ships were authorized. These ships, since call- 
ed the Alabama, Illinois, and Wisconsin, are now building. 
In the same act it is provided further : 

That the Secretary of the Navy is hereby directed to examine into 
the actual cost of armor plate and the price for the same which should 
be equitably paid, and shall report the result of his investigation to 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 5 

Congress at its next session at a date not later than January first, 
eighteen htmdred and ninety-seven, and no contract for armor plate 
for the vessels authorized by this act shall be made until after such 
report is made to Congress for its action. 

In accordance with the above-mentioned provision the 
Secretary of the Navy wrote to the Bethlehem Iron Com- 
pany and the Carnegie Steel Company asking that such 
data be furnished as would assist him in arriving at a 
fair conclusion. The companies, apprehending that any 
statements made might be erroneously construed and dis- 
torted to their disadvantage, and reluctant to expose pri- 
vate affairs to business rivals, decided after due consid- 
eration not to take any steps that would seem to admit 
the right of a customer to examine the cost of manufac- 
ture with the view of disputing prices. The Secretary 
then proceeded to secure the information desired by the 
appointment of a committee of naval officers, referred to 
as the Rohrer Board. In addition Lieutenant Rodgers 
and Ensign McVay, inspectors of armor at the works of 
the Bethlehem Iron Company and the Carnegie Steel 
Company, respectively, were each called upon to make a 
separate estimate. The Report of the Secretary of the 
Navy, under date of December 31, 1896, based upon the 
information thus obtained, was transmitted to the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives. (See document No. 151, 
H. R., 54th Congress, second session.) The Report of the 
Rohrer Board, including the reports of the naval officers, 
was dissented from by the Secretary, who reached entirely 
different conclusions concerning the cost of armor and the 
price to be paid for it. 



While accepting the naval officers' estimates for cost of 
labor and material Secretary Herbert made an allowance 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 6 

for maintenance of plant based not upon the actual cost 
of each plant but upon an estimated value which was less 
than one-half its cost. The allowance for maintenance 
was also based upon an output of about 3,000 tons a 
year for each plant, which is nearly 50 per cent, greater 
than the actual average output has been. On this basis 
the Secretary estimated that $400 per ton would be a fair 
price to be paid for the armor for the Alabama, Illinois, 
and Wisconsin. 

On page xix of Senate Report No. 1,453 the price of 
$400 as proposed in Secretary Herbert's Report is sum- 
marized by Senator Chandler as follows : 

Per Ton. 

The Secretary takes as the cost of labor and material iii dou- 
ble-forged, Harveyized, nickel-steel armor the sum of $196.00 

He assumes that a plant costing $1,500,000 would need $150,- 
000 per year for maintaining it, or $50 per ton upon 3,000 
tons of armor, and adds to the price 50.00 

Making $246.00 

Or in round numbers $250.00 

He then adds for profit 50 per cent., or 125.00 

Making $375.00 

He then adds for nickel, to be furnished hereafter by the con- 
tractors 20.00 

Making - $395.00 

Or in round niunbers 400.00 



THE SECRETARY S REPORT ANALYZED. 

On the face of the above statement the allowance of 
50 per cent, profit on the cost of manufacturing is alto- 
gether deceptive, the fact being overlooked that, with a 
small output from a large and costly plant, a manufac- 
turing company producing difficult shapes may have a 
large profit on the cost of manufacturing and yet realize 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 7 

very small returns on the capital invested. The lowest 
estimate of cost of plant and working capital of either 
the Bethlehem or the Carnegie Company is $4,000,000. 
The estimated profit of $125 per ton on 3,000 tons of 
armor amounts to $375,000, or 9.37 per cent, on the mon- 
ey actually invested. Deducting therefrom the legal rate 
of interest, 6 per cent., there remains but 3.37 per cent, 
to cover all the risks incurred in manufacturing. It wall 
be noted that in Senator Chandler's estimate for mainte- 
nance it is assumed that the plant cost $1,500,000, where- 
as the actual cost of the Carnegie Steel Company's armor 
plant, as subsequently reported by Secretary Herbert in 
his Supplementary Report, (document No. 151, part 2, 
H. R., 54th Congress, second session,) is given on page 5 
as $3,376,000, and, in his Report, Secretary Herbert states 
that the Bethlehem plant must have cost about $1,000,- 
000 more than the Carnegie plant, this difference being in 
part accounted for by the cost of the 125-ton hammer, the 
largest ever built in the world, which was put in by the 
Bethlehem Iron Company at the suggestion of the Navy 
Department, and, after less than three years' use, was dis- 
carded and replaced by a 14,000-ton forging press. 

With respect to the assumed valuation of a plant at 
$1,500,000, Secretary Long, in a letter to the Chairman 
of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the United States 
Senate, dated May 6, 1897, gives the views of the Chief 
of the Bureau of Ordnance thereon : 

It is also the Bureau's opinion that the sum named for the purpose 
of establishing a Govei'nment armor factory would be entirely inade- 
quate. Although $1,500,000 is the sum estimated by the Department 
as the present cost of an armor plant it must be remembered that 
such a plant, separated from the plant for the manufacture of steel 
ingots themselves, would be useless ; consequently if the Government 
proposes to go into the business of making armor plate it must es- 
tablish a plant complete in every respect. To obtain the necessary 





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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 8 

stock of material for working on a large scale and for the unavoid- 
able experimental work in the beginning it is thought that $3,000,000 
would be more nearly the sum required than $1,500,000. 

The estimated value of the Carnegie armor plant as 
reported by the Rohrer Board is $3,537,000. From the 
actual cost of this plant, viz : $3,376,000, as reported by 
Secretary Herbert in his Supplementary Report, there 
should be deducted the value of the land, amounting to 
1240,000, leaving in round numbers $3,000,000 as the cost 
of the plant on which to allow maintenance. This, at 10 
per cent., the rate adopted by Secretary Herbert, amounts 
to $300,000 per annum. In the foregoing statement the 
maintenance charge is also estimated on an output of 
8,000 tons of armor per annum, while the average output 
of either the Bethlehem Iron Company or the Carnegie 
Steel Company is to this date hardly 2,000 tons per an- 
num. Estimating this at 2,000 tons per annum makes 
$150 per ton for maintenance. The preceding statement, 
omitting the item of profit, would then read as follows : 

Cost of labor and material in double-forged, Harveyized, nick- 
el-steel armor, per ton $196.00 

Allowance for maintenance at 10 per cent, on plant costing $3,- 
000,000 would be $300,000 per annum, which, on an output 
of 2,000 tons per annum, would amount to, per ton 150.00 

Add for nickel, to be fornished hereafter by the contractor, 

per ton 20.00 

Making $366.00 

Armor sold at $400 per ton would thus yield a profit of 
$34 per ton, amounting, on 2,000 tons per year, to $68,000, 
or 1.7 per cent, on the capital invested, nothing being al- 
lowed for interest on the capital. Senator Chandler has 
dissented from the allowance of 10 per cent, for mainte- 
nance made by Secretary Herbert, and has estimated that 
6 per cent, would be sufl&cient. This would reduce the 
maintenance charge per toh to $90, making the total cost 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. \) 

/ $306 per ton of armor, or a profit of $94 per ton, which, 
on an annual output of 2,000 tons, would be |188,000, 
or 4.7 per cent, on the investment.] 

CONGRESSIONAL LIMITATION OF PRICE. 

With these estimates before it Congress, on March 3, 
1897, established an arbitrary price of $300 per ton to 
be paid for armor. To show approximately what this 
price means let it be assumed that for three years there 
have been manufactured 2,000 tons of armor per year, 
which is about the average quantity, and which, at the 
price of $300 per ton, would yield the gross sum of $1,- 
800,000, or $600,000 per year. The cost of the plant, 
with a fair allowance for working capital, would amount 
to about $4,000,000. If, therefore, armor should cost noth- 
ing to make, the above gross receipts per year would be 
only 15 per cent, on the capital invested in a plant which 
may within a few years be worthless. Foreign govern- 
ments are satisfied to pay for the same quality of armor 
over $500 per ton. American armor manufacturers have 
so successfully worked out sundry improvements in the 
manufacture of armor that the Government now receives 
armor of the same resistance as formerly, at the same 
price per ton, but with one-third less thickness and weight, 
thus reducing the actual cost of armor for the same 
amount of protection 33^ per cent. These improvements 
cost the armor makers heavily, both in higher actual 
cost of manufacture and in royalties for patents. 

REPORT FROM THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS. 

A Report of an investigation made by the Committee 
on Naval Affairs of the United States Senate, which was 
ordered by resolution of December 31, 1896, will be found 
in Senate Report No. 1,453, 54th Congress, second session. 



ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 10 

The recommendation of the committee concerning the 
price to be paid for armor as contained in this report is 
as follows : " That a fair average price be paid for armor 
for the three new battle-ships authorized by the act of 
June 10, 1896, which will be between |300 and |400 per 
ton of 2,240 pounds." This recommendation was based 
upon Secretary Herbert's Report, but proposed to reduce 
still further the amount allowed by Secretary Herbert for 
maintenance and profit. 

ACT OF MARCH 3, 1897, LIMITING THE PRICE. 

The act making appropriations for the naval service 
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1898, and for other 
purposes, (H. R. 10,336,) as it passed the House of Rep- 
resentatives, provided : 

That the total cost of the armor according to the plans and specifi- 
cations already prepared for the three battle-ships authorized by the 
act of June 10, 1896, shall not exceed 13,210,000 exclusive of the cost 
of transportation, ballistic test plates, and tests ; And provided further, 
That no portion of this armor shall be purchased until it has all been 
contracted for : And prodded further, That the Secretary of the Navy is 
authorized in his discretion to contract with either or all of the build- 
ers of the hulls and machinery of these vessels, or with one or more 
bidders, for the furnishing of the entire amount of said armor, if he 
shall deem it to the best interest of the Government. 

The above limitation of the cost of the armor, namely, 
$3,210,000, is at the rate of $400 per ton. 

In this act, as it finally passed both Houses of Con- 
gress and was approved March 3, 1897, the amount ap- 
propriated for the armor for these three battle-ships was 
reduced to $2,407,500, and it was further provided " that 
no contract for armor plate shall be made at an average 
rate to exceed $300 per ton of 2,240 pounds." The above 
provision, " that no portion of this armor shall be purchas- 
ed until it has all been contracted for," was stricken out. 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 11 

NO CONTRACTS AT THE PRICE FIXED. 

The Secretary of the Navy, under date of April 9, 
1897, transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Repre- 
sentatives a letter from the Illinois Steel Company in- 
closing two propositions in answer to the Department's 
advertisement, also a letter from the Bethlehem Iron 
Company and one from the Carnegie Steel Company, to- 
gether with a Report of the Chief of the Bureau of 
Ordnance of his visit to the works of the Illinois Steel 
Company. This correspondence is all printed in H. R. 
document No. 20, 55th Congress, first session. The Sec- 
retary of the Navy says : 

The communication of the Illinois Steel Company contaias a bid in 
the form of two general propositions, neither of which the Depart- 
ment feels that it has any authority to consider with the view of ac- 
ceptance or rejection ; while the other two communications received are 
not bids, but are statements of reasons why bids are not submitted. 

The other two communications referred to were those 
from the Bethlehem and the Carnegie companies. The 
proposition of the Illinois Steel Company reads as follows : 

We hereby ofiFer to furnish about 8,000 tons of nickel-steel armor 
plate and appurtenances for battle-ships Nos. 7, 8, and 9 at an average 
price of ^300 per ton of 2,240 pounds, free on board cars at our South 
Chicago works, conditioned upon Congress awarding us a contract for 
the entire wants of the United States Government for armor plate 
for a period of twenty years from this date, at an average price of 
$240 per ton of 2,240 pounds, the Government to agree that the total 
tonnage of armor plate, ordered as above for the period of 20 years, 
shall not be less than 6,000 nor more than 12,000 tons iu any one year. 

Should we be unable to furnish said minimum or maximum quan- 
tity of armor plate in any one year we agree to pay as damages the 
Sinn of $100 per ton for any such quantity as we may be in default 
of, the Government agreeing that, should it not require the minimum 
quantity in any one year, it will pay us §100 per ton as liquidated 
damages for the difference between the amount ordered by it and the 
above-named minimum. 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 12 

SECRETARY LONO's RECOMMENDATION. 

Secretary Long appeared before the Committee on Na- 
val Affairs of the United States Senate on May 19, 1897, 
and informed the committee that the Bethlehem Iron 
Company and the Carnegie Steel Company would make 
the armor for the three battle-ships then building at 
$425 per ton, and recommended that this price be paid. 

ACT OF JULY 19, 1897, FURTHER LIMITING THE PRICE. 

The Committee on Appropriations of the United States 
Senate reported back the "act making appropriations to 
supply the deficiencies in the appropriations for the fis- 
cal year ending June 30, 1897, and for prior years, and 
for other purposes," with a provision authorizing the 
Secretary of the Navy to contract for the armor for 
these three battle-ships at an average price of $425 per 
ton. This act, however, as passed by the Senate and 
House of Representatives, and approved July 19, 1897, 
provided under the head of armor plate : 

That the total cost of the armor accordmg to the weights prepared 
for the three battle-ships authorized by the act of June tenth, eight- 
een hundred and ninety-six, shall not exceed two million four hun- 
dred and seven thousand and five hundred dollars, exclusive of the 
cost of transportation, ballistic test plates, and tests; and no contract 
for armor plate shall be made at an average rate to exceed three hun- 
dred dollars per ton of two thousand two hundred and forty pounds; 
And provided further, that the Secretary of the Navy is authorized in 
his discretion to contract with either or all of the builders of the hulls 
and machinery of these vessels, or with any one or more bidders, for 
the furnishing of the entire amount of said armor, at a cost not ex- 
ceeding the aforesaid three hundred dollars per ton, if he shall deem 
it for the best interests of the Government. 

In case the Secretary of the Navy shall find it impossible to make 
contracts for said armor within the limits as to price fixed he shall 
be, and hereby is, authorized and directed to take steps to establish a 
Government armor factory of sufficient capacity to make such armor. 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 13 

In executing this authority he shall prepare a description and plans 
and specifications of the land, buildings, and machinery suitable for 
the factory; and shall advertise for proposals to furnish such land, 
buildings, and machinery as a whole plant, or separately, for the land 
or buildings, or the whole or any part of said machinery, and to re- 
port to Congress at its next session. The Secretary shall also appoint 
an armor factory board, to consist of competent naval officers of suit- 
able rank, to advise and assist him in executing the authority hereby 
conferred. 

REPORT OF ARMOR FACTORY BOARD. 

The Board appointed by the Secretary of the Navy 
under the foregoing provision made a thorough investi- 
gation of the entire subject, devoting four months to its 
work. The findings of the Board were submitted in a 
report filed with the Secretary on December 1, 1897. 
This document was presented to Congress, and gives am- 
ple proof of the armor manufacturers' statements relative 
to the cost of their plants, the Board finding from esti- 
mates of leading engineers and ordnance specialists, who 
were employed to submit plans and estimates, that it 
would require at the minimum $3,747,912 to establish 
an efficient plant capable of producing sufiicient armor 
for two battle-ships per year. This estimate, however, 
embraced only the armor plant and steel furnaces, and 
omitted many essentials necessary to form an independ- 
ent plant. From the statements submitted it is evident 
that the Board considered that a Government armor works 
would be a failure economically, because its product would 
likely be far more expensive than a similar product pur- 
chased from armor manufacturers engaged in the com- 
mercial branches of the steel industry. 

The report of the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance for 
1897 says with reference to the armor factory proposition : 

The Bureau is of the opinion that the Government can purchase 
armor more cheaply than it can manufacture it, and regards the mak- 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 14 

ing of armor as a proper adjimct to a great commercial steel plant. 
Foreign practice confirms this view ; and even should the Department ac- 
quire a plant of its own the chances are that it would be at a great cost, 
and that it would lie idle a large part of the time and thus suffer dete- 
rioration, and that the expense and difficulty of operating it when need- 
ed would more than offset any advantage gained by such ownership. 

THE WASHINGTON NAVY YARD AND WATERVLIET ARSENAL. 

The advocates of a Government armor works have 
largely based the claim that such an enterprise could 
be successfully operated and cheaper armor obtained on 
the fact that the Government produces heavy ordnance 
at the Washington Navy Yard and at Watervliet Arsenal. 
But all the guns produced by these Government shops 
are made from forgings supplied by private companies, 
whose work on them embraces all the metallurgical fea- 
tures of the process of manufacturing, beginning with 
the raw materials, and who supply them to the Govern- 
ment rough machined and fully treated, after which they 
are simply machined to finished dimensions, assembled, and 
so completed. These considerations have evidently been 
overlooked by the advocates of a Government armor plant. 

A Government armor plate factory which would be 
.comparable with the two Government plants above men- 
tioned would require the purchase of the armor plates 
all completed except finished machining ; and, since the 
armor plates must be practically otherwise finished before 
being hardened, it will be seen that no comparison can 
be made between the manufacture of guns and the man- 
ufacture of armor plate, the processes being entirely dif- 
ferent, and that no convincing argument in favor of a 
Government armor plate factory can be deduced from the 
fact that the Government completes the manufacture of 
guns from the rough machined forgings furnished by 
private manufacturers. 



ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 15 

FAILURE OF RUSSIA'S ARMOR PLANT. 

Another claim frequently made in Congress in support 
of a Government armor factory is that various Europe- 
an governments have successfully established armor works 
and supply their own requirements cheaper than would 
be possible by purchase. This claim is refuted by the 
following facts. 

Every naval power of Europe has, at different periods 
since the advent of the armor-clad ship, contemplated the 
step the United States has been urged to take, only to 
find that armor could not be manufactured successfully 
under State administration, or that the cost in the event 
of successful production would be much higher than the 
price at which it could be purchased from private manu- 
facturers. Great Britain, which has bought, and may 
continue to buy, more armor than any other three naval 
powers in the world, determined this question negatively 
long ago as the result of an investigation by an Admiral- 
ty Commission. As a result the naval powers of Europe 
continue to buy armor from European manufacturers at 
unquestioned and much higher prices than the United 
States has paid American manufacturers for armor of 
superior quality. 

Russia, being dependent upon foreign sources of supply, 
owing to the limited development of her metallurgical 
industry and the unwillingness of private capital in that 
country to invest in such a hazardous undertaking as ar- 
mor manufacturing, established a government plant at 
Kolpino, near St. Petersburg, as a measure of national 
safety, for, in the event of war, Russia would, of course, 
be obliged to rely entirely on its own resources for armor 
and ordnance. The Kolpino works, it is said, have 
cost from |8,000,000 to $10,000,000 and are still incom- 
plete. This is the only government armor plant in the 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 16 

world, and the Russian ordnance engineers concede that 
it can never be operated as economically as private es- 
tablishments in America and Europe, but, as a home 
resource, it is invaluable, and it is to be maintained by 
the Russian Government regardless of cost, to be put in 
operation whenever the exigencies of war and the neu- 
trality laws preclude the purchase of armor and ordnance 
from foreign countries. 

A large percentage of the armor produced at the Kol- 
pino establishment has failed to meet the ballistic stand- 
ard, and much of it has been discarded as useless. Rus- 
sia undertook to produce a large quantity of armor at its 
own works for some of its vessels now building, but, after 
many failures, the Government was compelled to aban- 
don the work, the orders being withdrawn and contracts 
placed with European and American manufacturers for 
the armor, the Bethlehem Iron Company and the Carne- 
gie Steel Company each receiving a share of the work 
thus unsuccessfully attempted, and at higher prices than 
the United States was then paying these companies for 
the same class of armor. 

The Russian Government has now adopted the most 
advanced armor process of the present period and will al- 
most entirely remodel the Kolpino plant at an additional 
cost of many millions to keep pace with the improvements 
in armor manufacture, but, judging by its past experience, 
it is reasonably certain that the plant will never produce 
armor as cheaply or of so reliable quality as the works 
under the control of commercial steel manufacturers. 



IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN ARMOR AT $800 PER TON. 

\_Secretary Long appeared before the Senate Naval Com- 
mittee in February, 1898, and stated that it was impossi- 
ble to obtain bids for the armor for battle-ships 7, 8, and\ 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 17 

9 at the limit o£ $300 per ton fixed by the Act of March 
3, 1897, and the Act of July 19, 1897, and recommended 
that the price be increased to $400 per ton. Congress 
adopted the Secretary's recommendation in the Act of 
May 4, 1898, making appropriations for the naval estab- 
lishment for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1899, and 
authorized the payment of $400 per ton for armor for 
battle-ships 7, 8, and 9, exclusive of royalty for the face- 
hardening process, which price the Navy Department final- 
ly induced the armor manufacturers to accept, the con- 
tracts being closed on June 3, 1898. Fortunately the war 
with Spain was of short duration and the new battle-ships 
were not required, but, if hostilities had been prolonged, 
the ships could not have been available for that war, and 
by reason of the delay will not be finished in the con- 
tract time. The dilatory action of Congress may also re- 
sult in claims for damages from the shipbuilders in con- 
sequence of the Government's neglect to provide the ar- 
mor on schedule time. 

RUSSIAN CONTRACTS FOR AMERICAN ARMOR. 

The extremely low price, $249 per ton, at which the 
Bethlehem Iron Company contracted in December, 1894, 
to furnish the Russian Government with about 1,500 tons 
of nickel-steel armor, of which only about one-third was 
Harveyized, and which was mainly of very plain and 
easily made shapes, was one cause of bringing the ques- 
tion of the price of armor to the attention of Congress, 
and has led many persons to feel that our own Gov- 
ernment should be able to purchase its material from 
home manufacturers at an equally low price. Plausible 
as this contention may appear a fair consideration of 
the facts will justify the action of the Bethlehem Iron 
Company. 



ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 18 

The great improvement in armor made in the United 
States by the introduction of nickel, and continued by 
the application of the Harvey process, was well known 
to the Russian Government and made it desirous of put- 
ting American-made armor on its ships. When the in- 
vitation to bid on armor plates was received from Russia 
in December, 1894, work on pending contracts with the 
United States was rapidly drawing to an end, and there 
was no prospect of receiving other orders from that source 
until additional ships should be authorized by Congress. 
Thus the Bethlehem Iron Company was about to suffer 
grievously by being compelled to shut down its armor 
plant because of the course pursued by the Government 
in establishing a second plant and dividing its orders, 
whereby neither plant could be kept steadily employed. 
Under these circumstances it was extremely desirable to 
obtain outside work in order to employ and keep together 
specially trained labor and to prevent the demoralization 
of plant and organization. The situation was one with 
which every business man and manufacturer is familiar, 
that under the circumstances it was better to take the 
work, even if at a loss, without reference to fixed charg- 
es, than to have no work at all. In addition to this it 
was recognized that the placing of an order for armor by 
Russia with a United States concern, in competition with 
all the European manufacturers, would be a notable event 
in the rapid march of the steel industry in this country, 
and would be the best possible method of heralding to 
the world that, though young in the business, the United 
States manufacturers had mastered the art and were ready 
to compete with all the world for the supply of armor 
plates of the highest quality. These motives induced 
both the American companies to send their agents to 
Russia with instructions to take the worh. 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 19 

The European manufacturers were, of course, much 
averse to the advent of American makers into the field, 
and determined to offer a stout resistance by bidding low 
prices. These prices were, however, met by the American 
companies, between which an active competition followed, 
resulting in the contract being awarded to the Bethlehem 
Company at the ruinously low price above mentioned. 
To make armor continuously at such a price could only 
bring disaster, for a great expenditure of capital, energy, 
and skill would have been made without returns. Surely 
the Government of the United States, the reputation of 
whose warships was raised by this transaction, can not, 
when dealing with its own manufacturers, whose con- 
tinued prosperous existence must form the corner-stone 
of national defense, justly consider as a precedent for its 
future action a price made under the circumstances above 
described. 

It should be noted that the contract as originally made 
with the Russian Government was for 1,264 tons, with 
the proviso that this amount might be increased by 300 
tons at the option of the Russian Marine. The order was 
so increased, and the total amount furnished at the low 
price was 1,561 tons. It was, as has been said, armor of 
comparatively simple shape, much less difficult to manu- 
facture than the average armor for our own ships, and 
only part of it was to be Harveyized. It was delivered 
promptly at the date fixed by the contract, and met suc- 
cessfully the severe requirements imposed by the Rus- 
sian specifications. The Russian Government was so well 
pleased with these plates, and generally with the manner 
in which the contract was executed, that subsequently, in 
December, 1895, it made a contract with the Bethlehem 
Company for about 1,100 tons and with the Carnegie 
Company for about 1,000 tons of hard-faced, nickel-steel 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 20 

armor at average prices of |527 and |530 per ton respect- 
ively. These prices are still about the average market 
prices of the world for armor plates of the same quality. 

KRUPP'S NEW PROCESS ARMOR. 

The Act of May 4, 1898, authorized the construction of 
three battle-ships, subsequently named the Blaine, Ohio, and 
Missouri, requiring on the revised plans about 2,730 tons 
of armor each, and four harbor-defense monitors, Arkan- 
sas, Florida, Connectiad, and Wyoming, requiring about 538 
tons of armor each, at the same price limit of $400 per 
ton, as stipulated for the Alabama, Illinois, and Wisconsin. 
The advertisements for this armor were withheld beyond 
the usual time, as the Navy Department learned that 
Herr Krupp had perfected a new process for the fabri- 
cation of armor at his ordnance works at Essen, Ger- 
many, that gave a product much superior to Harveyized 
armor and revolutionized the ballistic standard. The 
Navy Department, after a thorough investigation, decided 
to adopt Krupp armor for the ships, but could not do so 
without Congressional authority, and, as Congress did not 
meet until December, 1898, the contracts were held over. 

Krupp's new process armor, as it is now generally 
styled, is the result of years of experiment and the ex- 
penditure of a large amount of capital. The tests of the 
first plates were made on Krupp's proving ground in 
Meppen, Germany, in 1895, but the records were not an- 
nounced at that time. Subsequent tests made before the 
ordnance engineers of the European admiralties showed 
from 20 to 30 per cent, more resistance to the attack of 
armor-piercing projectiles than Harveyized armor. As a 
result of these tests the new armor was immediately 
adopted by England, France, Russia, Japan, and Germany. 

Herr Fried. Krupp then offered the manufacturing 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 21 

rights to the armor makers of the world, stipulating the 
payment of a large sum for the license, and, in addition, 
from |45 to $50 per ton as royalty on every ton manufac- 
tured. The Carnegie Steel Company and the Bethlehem 
Iron Company, the two American armor manufacturers, 
contracted for the exclusive manufacturing rights in 
America under Herr Krupp's terms, which have also been 
accepted by the armor makers of England, France, and 
Italy. The American manufacturers sent their experts to 
the Krupp works in Essen to be instructed in the details 
of the new process, which, under the contract with the 
inventor, is held a secret, and, therefore, the metallurgi- 
cal details have not been patented.* 

TESTS OF KRUPP ARMOR. 

The Carnegie Steel Company, Limited, manufactured 
the first armor plate made by the Krupp process in 
America. This plate was tested by the Bureau of Ord- 
nance of the Navy Department on the Indian Head prov- 
ing ground, on July 13, 1898, and it successfully with- 
stood a heavy gun fire of 25 per cent, greater severity 
than the best Harveyized armor plate of equal thickness 
ever tested. The results of this remarkable test were re- 
ported by Commander A. R. Couden to the Navy De- 

* The patent granted by the United States for a furnace of improved design used 
at the Krupp works for carbonizing or face-hardening armor plates, referred to in 
Congress by Senator Butler (Congressional Record, March 1, 1899, p. 2,844,) and by 
Representative Albert M. Todd, (Congressional Record, February 22, 1899, p. 2,883,) 
is not an essential part of the process for making the new armor, but describes 
an improved furnace in which two armor plates may be supercarbonized instead of 
one, as heretofore, by well-known methods of applying hydro-carbon gases, illumi- 
nating gas, paraflane vajwr, etc., the improvement in this case consisting of mak- 
ing the armor plates to be thus treated a part of the furnace structure. This 
patent does not include the secret metal amalgamation feature employed in mak- 
ing the new armor, a knowledge of which is absolutely essential, nor does it deal 
in any way with the various complicated treatments entering into the manufacture 
of Krupp armor. 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 22 

partment and the data are now part of the Department 
records. The plate showed a capacity to resist projectile 
perforation at the unprecedented velocity for a six-inch 
armor test of 2,350 feet per second from a six-inch gun 
fired at point-blank range. In October of the same year 
a twelve-inch experimental Kruppized plate manufactured 
by the Carnegie Steel Company, Limited, was tested by 
the Bureau of Ordnance. Rear Admiral Charles O'Neil, 
Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, the highest authority in 
the United States Navy, and one of the leading ordnance 
engineers of the world, in a letter to the Senate Naval 
Committee referred to these tests as showing marked 
qualities of excellence and of superiority over the ordi- 
nary face-hardened armor. 

In November, 1898, a plate six inches thick, manufac- 
tured by the Bethlehem Iron Company by the Krupp 
process, was tested at the Redington proving ground un- 
der the supervision of the United States Naval Inspector 
and in the presence of the Commission representing the 
Imperial Russian Marine stationed at the ship yard of 
the William Cramp and Son's Ship and Engine Building 
Company. This plate was attacked with an eight-inch 
instead of a six-inch gun, six shots being fired at it with 
a striking velocity varying from 1,521 to 1,823 feet per 
second. It showed a resistance to penetration much in 
excess of Harveyized armor of the same thickness, and, 
notwithstanding this tremendous attack, when the suc- 
cessive impacts were considerably closer together than 
were required by the Government specifications, no cracks 
whatever were developed. 

In the month of December, 1898, an experimental 
Krupp plate seven and three-quarters inches thick, made 
by the Bethlehem Iron Company, successfully withstood 
a very severe test of five shots from an eight-inch gun, 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 23 

the striking velocities being unusually high, developing a 
total energy of 36,432 foot tons, and no cracks resulting. 

GREATER COST OF KRUPP ARMOR. 

The material of which Krupp armor is made is exceed- 
ingly sensitive to the varying conditions inherent in the 
process of manufacture, such as melting, forging, rolling, 
heating, cooling, etc. ; hence all these processes must be 
carried out with the greatest possible accuracy and uni- 
formity as to detail. In other words, the process repre- 
sents a scientific refinement of metallurgical methods quite 
unknown heretofore in the treatment of such large masses 
of metal. As a result it can be stated that the applica- 
tion of this process to the manufacture of armor is much 
more difiicult and is accompanied by greater uncertain- 
ties and liability to loss than is the case in applying the 
Harvey process to nickel-steel armor. Furthermore, the 
number of separate operations is far greater than in the 
application of the Harvey process, and the metal is more 
difl&cult to machine in all stages of manufacture. 

To summarize, the following reasons can be given why 
armor made by the Krupp process costs more to manu- 
facture than the hard-faced, nickel-steel armor heretofore 
purchased by the Government : 

1. Greater cost of materials used. 

2. Greater number of operations through which each 
plate has to pass, by which charges are increased and 
product reduced. 

3. Greater percentage of loss, due to uncertainties and 
liability to errors in manufacture. 

4. Greater difiiculty in cutting the metal cold, whereby 
the product of machine tools is decreased. 

5. Reduction in the average thickness of plates, corre- 
sponding to greater ballistic resistance, whereby the num- 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 24 

ber of individual plates in a given total tonnage is in- 
creased. This causes a corresponding increase in the 
number of operations to be performed and the amount 
of machine work to be done, and materially decreases 
the weight of the product that can be produced by a 
given plant within a given time. 

In response to a request from the Bureau of Ordnance 
for information as to the price of armor manufactured 
by the new process the manufacturers agreed to furnish 
it to the United States for $545 per ton, which included 
the royalty to be paid the inventor. It should be borne in 
mind that the price named was for armor having a bal- 
listic resistance 25 per cent, greater than that of Harvey- 
ized armor, and that this price is less than that paid for 
Kruppized armor by any other government in the world. 

The Navy Department communicated this information 
to Congress in a letter from Rear Admiral O'Neil, who 
stated that positive evidence had been received by the 
Navy Department that British armor manufacturers were 
receiving not less than £117 sterling ($568.62) on large 
domestic and foreign contracts, and that the Carnegie 
and Bethlehem Companies will receive $575 per ton for 
the armor for the Russian battle-ship now building at 
Philadelphia. Admiral O'Neil urged that only the best 
armor that could be manufactured should be procured, 
and concluded his report (Congressional Record, March 
1, 1899, pp. 2,835, 2,836, and 2,837) thus : 

The Bureau of Ordnance desires to be placed on record as recom- 
mending to the Department that only the best quality of armor that 
can be obtained in this country shall be placed on vessels of the Uni- 
ted States Navy, regardless of price. To do otherwise will destroy the 
prestige of our naval vessels, and the Bureau trusts that such steps 
will be taken by the Navy Department as will absolve it entirely 
from responsibility in the matter if it is forced to procure armor of 
a quality inferior to the best that can be manufactured. 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 



25 



IMPROVEMENTS IN QUALITY OP ARMOR. 

Admiral O'Neil recently submitted a table of ballistic 
velocities, showing that the proposed tests for Kruppized 
armor would be such as are now applied to Harveyized 
plates of 25 per cent, greater thickness ; that is, the same 
test will be applied to a six-inch Krupp plate that has 
heretofore been applied to a Harveyized plate of seven and 
one-half inches; to an eight-inch Krupp plate that which 
has been applied to ten-inch Harveyized armor ; to a ten- 
inch Krupp plate that which has been applied to Har- 
veyized armor of twelve and one-half inches ; and to a 
twelve-inch Krupp plate that which has been applied to 
Harveyized armor of fifteen inches; the difference in re- 
quirements being illustrated in the following table of min- 
imum velocities of feet per second for the Harveyized and 
the Kruppized armor — one shot at the Harveyized plate 
and three shots at the Kruppized plate at given velocity. 
The test of Harveyized plates also provided for a previ- 
ous shot at a lower velocity. 



Calibre of Gun. 


Thickness of Plate. 


Harveyized Armor. 


Krupp Armor. 


4 inch 


4 inch 


1,676 f. s. 


1,818 f. s. 


5 inch 


5 inch 


1,717 f. s. 


2,045 f. s. 


6 inch 


6 inch 


1,659 f. s. 


1,885 f. s. 


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8 inch 


1,558 f. s. 


1,772 f. s. 


10 inch 


10 inch 


1,502 f. s. 


1,765 f. s. 


12 inch 


12 inch 


1,469 f. s. 


1,661 f. s. 



In another official communication upon this subject 
Admiral O'Neil said : 

The advantages to be derived from the use of Krupp armor are ob- 
vious and need not be enlai^ed upon, it being sufficient to state that a 
twelve-inch plate of the new process armor would be equivalent to a 
fifteen-inch plate of the quality now being used, thus affording equal 
protection on 25 per cent, less weight, or 25 per cent, greater protec- 
tion with present weights. 

As only a limited weight can be assigned for armor for hull and gun 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 26 

protection (23 per cent, of displacement in the Maine class of vessels) 
it will be readily understood how essential it is that the best and most 
resisting armor obtainable should be procured, in order that the great- 
est possible area of the vessel may be well protected, especially the 
water-lLne, machinery space, and gun emplacements, within the limits 
of weight allowable for such purposes. 

The maximum thickness of the side-belt armor on the Alahuvia 
class is sixteen and one-half inches, whereas on the Maine class (au- 
thorized December 12, 1898,) it is proposed to have a maximum thick- 
ness of twelve inches for the same armor, thus obtaming the same 
protection on about 25 per cent, less weight, and to utilize the weight 
thus saved by increasing the thickness of the casemate armor which 
protects the six-inch guns to seven inches, as against five and one-half 
inches on the Alabama class, thus greatly improving the vessels of the 
Maine class as regards the distribution of armor, this being upon the 
assumption that the new process armor will be supplied to the latter 
vessels. 

The Eussian battle-ship of 12,500 tons' displacement now being built 
at Cramp's shipyard is to carry the new process armor, one-half being 
supplied by the Carnegie Company and the other half by the Bethle- 
hem Company, and these companies state that the price they are to re- 
ceive for this armor is greater than that they would ask of this Gov- 
ernment — that is, more than $545 per ton. 

At the present time there are four battle-ships being built for the 
British Government in England, namely, Vengea.nce, Canopus, Albion, 
and Glory ; also four battle-ships for the Japanese Government and four 
armored cruisers for the British Government and three for Japan. In 
addition to the above vessels, all of which it is understood are to be 
supplied with the new process armor, the British Admiralty has asked 
for tenders for four battle-ships and two large armored cruisers, all of 
which will have armor similar to that to be provided for the other 
ships referred to above. 

The special featiu-es which characterize the new process armor are 
its depth of hard face, extreme toughness of back, and its ability to 
resist numerous impacts at high velocity without perforation or crack 
to a marked degree as compared with the present service armor. 

The House Committee on Naval Affairs, unwilling to 
recommend a change in the law regulating the price to 
be paid for armor without ample justification for such 
action, summoned Admiral O'Neil to give his opinion 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 27 

with respect to the merits of the new process armor more 
fully than he gave in the several communications quoted. 
Admiral O'Neil accordingly appeared before the commit- 
tee and conclusively established the fact that the new 
armor was all that it was claimed to be by the manu- 
facturers. The committee accepted Admiral O'Neil's rec- 
ommendation and thereupon reported a bill increasing the 
limit of price to enable the purchase of the improved 
armor for the new ships. Congress, however, would not 
accept the recommendation of the Government's ordnance 
experts and the committee's recommendation was rejected. 
It was claimed, in justification, that, no evidence had been 
presented that Krupp armor was superior to the Har- 
veyized grade, notwithstanding the existence of the ofii- 
cial record containing such evidence. 

Despite the ascertained facts concerning the quality of 
Kruppized armor and the prices paid therefor by Euro- 
pean governments. Congress, instead of increasing the price 
as urged by the Navy Department, reaffirmed its limit of 
$400 per ton, exclusive of royalty, for the armor for the 
vessels provided for by the Act of May 4, 1898, amount- 
ing to about ten thousand tons; and for the armor for 
the ships authorized by the Act of March 3, 1899, 
amounting to about fourteen thousand tons, it reduced 
the price to be paid to |300 per ton, including royalties. 
Under this limitation the Navy Department advertised for 
proposals on March 29, 1899, but specified the Kruppized 
armor ballistic standard instead of the Harveyized, or, 
to be more precise, the Department called for plate which 
would pass a test that only Kruppized armor could 
withstand, as it was determined to have none but the 
best armor, but, at the same time, the Department was 
limited to a price which could not even buy Harveyized 
armor for the ships authorized in March, 1899. 




J25-TON STEAM HAMMER FOR FORGING ARMOR PLATE. 

Showing an ingot supported by one of the two traveling cranes. 
BETHLEHEM STEEL COMPANY. 



ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 28 

CONTRACTORS DECLINE TO FURNISH THE ARMOR SPECIFIED. 

This advertisement was before the steel manufacturers 
of the country for two months, and not a manufacturer 
in the country offered to take this contract, which is one 
of the largest ever authorized, for the obvious reason 
that the business was regarded as unprofitable at the 
figure set by Congress, and that it was realized that the 
high standard of excellence demanded could only be at- 
tained with the Krupp process. 

The Carnegie Steel Company, Limited, and the Beth- 
lehem Iron Company declined to tender under the price 
conditions and ballistic requirements, stating that to man- 
ufacture the quality of armor specified in the Depart- 
ment circular would necessitate the employment of the 
Krupp process, which involves greatly increased cost. Both 
contractors, however, offered at the same time to furnish 
all or any part of the armor under the same conditions 
and prices stipulated in the armor contracts for the 
Alabama, Illinois, and Wisconsin, which specified the Har- 
veyized quality, at a price of $400 per ton. The De- 
partment rejected the offers, but contracted, however, for 
Harveyized armor at |400 per ton for the monitors 
Florida, Connecticut, Wyoming, and Arkansas, this quality 
of armor being regarded as sufficiently good for the low 
free-board harbor-defense vessels. 

Since Congress has thus interrupted the construction 
of United States warships the selling values of all cus- 
tomary forms of iron and steel have more than doubled. 
Not only have the prices of iron ore, fuel, pig iron, and 
labor greatly risen, but even at these higher prices it is 
extremely difficult for iron and steel makers to meet the 
urgent demands upon them. It is under these circumstan- 
ces that Congress must now consider what course it will 
take in regard to authorizing purchases of needful armor. 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE KAVY, 29 

APPENDIX. 



EXHIBIT A. 



The following letter from the Carnegie Steel Company fully answers the 
charge ivhich has been made that, under the prices Jieretofore paid for 
Harveyized armor, unusual profits have been made by the manufactur- 
ers, sufficient, in excess of a fair return, to reimburse them for the cost 
of their plants. 

Sir : There seems to be an impression prevalent that we have made 
unusual profits on armor. We beg your kind perusal of the following 
statement, which we believe must correct this most fallacious belief. 

IN THE MATTEH OF THE COST OF ARMOR PLATE. 

Deductions from the figures now before Congress in the Eeport of 
the Hon. H. A. Herbert, late Secretary of the Navy. 

Total value of the Carnegie armor plant $3,376,019.77 

Average date of expenditure, determined from same Report: March, 

1892. 
Armor shipped October, 1891, to March, 1897, inclusive, 12,482 gross 

tons — an average of 2,270 tons per year. 
Proceeds of same, $6,764,476.87, or 1541.94 per ton. Per Ton. 

Secretary Herbert's basis of cost of manufacture, labor, and 

material, excluding maintenance $197.78 

Maintenance, 10 per cent, on cost of plant, excluding land and 

interest, $306,101.97 per annum, or, on 2,270 tons* 134.84 

Total cost of armor plate as established on Secretary Herbert's 

basis $332.62 

SUMMARY AND DEDUCriONS. 

12,482 tons of armor shipped. 

Proceeds, per ton $541.94 $6,764,476.87 

Cost, per ton 332.62 4,151,762.87 

Profit, without allowance for depreciation. $209.32 $2,612,714.00 

Or $475,039 per annum. == " 

* It may be explained that 10 per cent, of cost of plant for maintenance means 
all repairs to plant and new machinery required by reason of change in methods, 
which are very frequent in the manufacture of armor, but does not include any 
charges for interest or depreciation. 



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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 30 

Investment— Plant $3,376,019.77 

Working capital 750,000.00 

Total $4,126,019.77 

Annual return, without allowance for depreciation or for interest on 

investment, about llj per cent. 
Total cost of plant $3,376,019.77 

Deduct — Land $240,000 

Salvage f 1,000,000 1,240,000.00 

Loss when Navy shall have been completed in, say, 15 

years! $2,136,019.77 

Or $142,401 per annum. 
Net revenue for manufacturing, $332,638 per annum, or 8 per cent, per 

annum on capital invested. 

As you will see by this statement it is impossible for us to make 
more than a moderate return from this the most difficult branch of 
steel manufacture. This is largely true because the Government only 
orders from us, on an average, sufficient armor to run our enormous 
plant to one-third of its capacity. Quantity, in the manufacture of 
armor, is the most important item in determining the cost of armor. 
This was clearly shown by the bid of the Illinois Steel Company, in 
wliich they specify that a minimum of 6,000 tons per year should be 
provided and that they should receive $100 per ton as a premium on 
all under 6,000 tons per year. If this had been a condition of our 
contracts with the Government we would have been paid $2,280,000 
during the past six years for this one clause alone. 

As you will clearly see from the above statement it is impossible for 
us to make even a moderate return where only 2,000 tons of armor 
per year are ordered, even at present prices. 

If the Government will give us an average of 2,000 tons of armor 
per year, at present prices, we will very gladly make all over that 
quantity at $400 per ton. 

In conclusion we beg you will give the above statement careful con- 
sideration, and note especially that no charge has been made for 
depreciation in value of plant when the Navy shall have been com- 
pleted, nor any charge for interest on investment. It will be seen 
by the rate of profit that the assumption that the plant has been paid 
for out of armor plate contracts is unfounded. 

Very Respectfully Yours, The Carnegie Steel Company, Limited. 

PiTTSBUKGH, Pa., April 17, 1897. 

t Salvage here means what can be saved out of the -wreck; when the works 
built for armor plate making shall be no longer used for that purpose. 



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J4,000-TON HYDRAULIC PRESS FOR FORGING "ARMOR [PLATE 
AND OTHER HEAVY FORCINGS. 

BETHLEHEM STEEL COMPANY. 



ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 



31 



EXHIBIT B. 



Table showing (Jie Cost of Harveyized Armor Plate as estimated by the 
Navy DepaHment, and Profits to the Manufacturers, with Harveyized Ar- 
mor selling at ^400 and §540 per ton respectively. 





Rohrer 


Lieut. 


Ensign 


Secretary 
Herbert's 




Board. 


Eodgers. 


McVay. 


summary. 


Cost of labor and material only.... 


$167.30 


$178.59 


$161.54 




For material rejected in process 










of manufacture, viz ; 10 per cent. 


16.70 


17.86 


16.15 




For rpforo'ine' 


12.45 


12.40 


12.40 










$196.45 


$208.85 


$190.09 


$197.78 


Cost for Nickel 


20.00 


20.00 


20.00 


20.00 






Total cost of labor and material... 


$216.45 


$228.85 


$210.09 


$217.78 


Maintenance on plant costing §3,- 










000,000, taking Senator Chand- 










ler's low estimate of 6 per cent., 










and making 2,000 tons of plates 










per year - 


90.00 


90.00 


90.00 


90.00 








$306.45 


$318.85 


$300.09 


$307.78 


Plates at $400 per ton would show 










a profit per ton of 


93.55 


81.15 


99.91 


92.22 


Or total profits on 2,000 tons of. 


187,100 


162,300 


199,820 


184,440 


Would show the investment of 










$4,000,000, m property and 






• 




working capital, returning an- 










nually 


4.68% 


4.06% 


4.99% 


4.61% 


On the basis of 10 per cent, for 






maintenance, as allowed by 










Secretary Herbert, the profit 










per ton of armor selling at $400 










would be - 


$33.55 


$21.15 


$39.91 


$32.22 


Making the annual return on in- 










vestment from a product of 2,- 










000 tons 


1.68% 


1.06% 


1.99% 


1.61% 


On the basis of 10 per cent, for 










maintenance and arnior selling 










at $540 per ton the profit per 










ton would be 


$173.55 


$161.15 


$179.91 


$172.22 


Making the annual return on in- 










vestment from a product of 










2 000 tons . 


8.68% 


8.06% 


8.99% 


8.61% 







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ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 32 



The New American Warship Armor that is a 
Veritable Miracle in Metal. 

From The New York Journal. 

Tests made lately by the Government of the new Krupp armor for 
our warships show results that astound even naval experts. It has 
been proven that armor metal has at last been devised that is practi- 
cally perfect. In the trials made at Indian Head the Krupp plates 
showed that they had greater resistance than the hardest of the pres- 
ent Harveyized, nickel-steel armor, and, unlike the Harveyized plates, 
they did not crack or break up under the most terrific fire. 

Although but 12 inches or less in thickness most of the heavy pro- 
jectiles fired at close range merely indented the plates, shattered them- 
selves, and fell outside the armor. Even the biggest shells, that stinick 
with an impact of thousands of tons and finally penetrated the armor, 
did not shatter or crack the plates at all. 

Hitherto the cracking of armor plates has been their chief defect. 
But the new Krupp process shows that an armor has now been made 
that is at once of the greatest resisting quality and at the same time 
perfectly malleable. It is almost a miracle in the metallurgist's art. 
A vessel covered with this plating could pass under the fire of the 
greatest man-of-war afioat, resist all but the biggest shells, and be 
pierced by a dozen of the latter as if she were a wooden ship, and 
yet not have her sides broken up or her plates displaced. 

A huge plate of this new Krupp armor was tested at the Indian 
Head proving grounds recently. The plate was 8J feet wide by 10 
feet long and 12 inches thick. The gun used for firing carried a 12- 
inch projectile, next to the largest size used in the Navy. The projec- 
tile weighed 847 pounds. At the first shot it was discharged at a ve- 
locity of 1,833 feet per second, and struck the armor plate with a 
force of 19,797 tons. The shell penetrated to a depth of 8J inches and 
then broke up. The plate was not cracked, and looked as a piece of 
lead would if struck by an old-fashioned cannon ball. 

In the second shot the velocity of the projectile was increased to 
2,022 feet per second, with a striking energy of 24,000 tons. The pro- 
jectile passed through the armor and broke up, but there were no 
cracks in the plate. 

The third shot struck with a force of 21,302 tons and just barely 
passed through the plate and broke up. Some of the pieces fell in 
front of the plate. Still no cracks appeared. 




7,000-TON HYDRAULIC PRESS FOR BENDING ARMOR PLATE. 

BETHLEHEM STEEL COMPANY. 



ARMOR PLATE FOR THE NAVY. 33 

Other shots were fired upon this Knipp plate. Many made only a 
rough spot on the malleable armor. Others that succeeded in pene- 
trating the plate made clean cut holes through it within two or 
three feet of one another. Yet no cracks appeared. The new plate 
had stood the test as had no other kind of armor ever made. 

It will now be used for all the new warships and will make them 
capable of resisting the most fearful battering that an enemy could 
inflict upon them. 



A Champion Krupp Process Plate. 

From The New York Iron Age. 

There was recently tested in England by John Brown & Co. a 
plate manufactured by the Krupp process, representing part of the ar- 
mor for the Japanese battle ship Asahi, with the following results, the 
thickness of the plate being 8.8 inches, and the projectile used being 
8-inch armor piercing, made by the American Wheeler-Sterling process : 

Striking velocity. StriMng energy. 

First round 1,859 feet per second. 5,991 foot-tons. 

Second round 1,964 feet per second. 6,687 foot-tons. 

Third round 2,039 feet per second. 7,208 foot-tons. 

All the projectiles were completely shattered, the points of all three 
being welded into the plate. There were absolutely no cracks what- 
ever, and the penetration was very slight. 

As a comparison a plate 9 inches in thickness, manufactured by the 
Harvey process, which is 0.2 inch thicker than the above Krupp plate, 
representing the turret armor for the United States battle-ships 
Kearsarge and Kentucky, was tested at the Indian Head proving 
grounds, with the following results, the projectile used being an 8- 
inch Wheeler-Sterling armor piercing : Striking velocity, 1,734 feet per 
second ; striking energy, 5,217 foot-tons ; penetration, 4.5 inches. 

This is the best Harveyized plate of this thickness of which there 
is any record, yet it will be readily seen how much inferior it is 
to the above mentioned Krupp plate. 



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HISTORY 



OF THE 



MANUFACTURE OF ARMOR PLATE 



FOR THE 



UNITED STATES NAVY. 



COMPILED BY 

The American Iron and Steel Association. 



1899. 



